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*
SINCE the day, four years ago, on which the Japanese began the
mihtary occupation of Manchuria which led to the estabhshment
of "^lanchoutikuo," a series of significant developments have oc-
curred in China which reveal a conscious efit'ort on the part of the
government to revive Confucianism. In the spring of 1934 General
Chiang Kai-shek launched the "New Life Movement" aiming at
the moral regeneration of the Chinese people and their leaders. It
emphasizes the traditional Confucian virtues of li, i, lien, and chih,
which may roughly be rendered
—
proper decorum, righteous conduct,
honesty, and self-respect. A code of ninety-six articles was pro-
mulgated regulating individual and social conduct. It is believed
that the proper observance of these simple rules of daily conduct
will give expression in accordance with Confucian tradition, to the
corresponding inner virtues of honesty, integrity, loyalty, and self-
respect.
A few months later, the Central Executive Committee of the
Kuomintang decided to include the birthday of Confucius in the list
of the national holidays of China. As a consequence Confucian
temples in various parts of the country are being refurbished, and
on the birthday of the Sage, proper ceremonies are to be there con-
ducted by the local officials in the time-honored manner. Last Au-
gust high officials representing the National Government traveled
from Nanking to Chii-fu in Shantung, where the direct lineal
descendants of Confucius now live, to conduct ceremonies at the
temple erected to his memory. The government has appropriated
a considerable sum of money to be devoted to the renovation of this
temple and its surrounding grounds.
The drift toward the establishment of Confucianism as a state
cult can also be seen in the new title given the eldest living male
descendant of Confucius. In the early part of the present year it
was decided to change his title from that of "Duke of Extended
Sagehood," conferred in 1233, to "Sacrificial Official for the Late
Teacher." Thus the old title reminiscent of the monarchy and
aristocracy was abolished as not being in harmony with the spirit of
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a republican regime, and at tlie same time the new title conferred
reveals the close connection with the reviving cult to the govern-
ment. Further evidence of the trend toward reverence of the past
took place in April of this year when three government leaders rep-
resenting the Kuomintang and the national government visited the
alleged tomb of the Emperor Huang Ti, the mythological founder
of Chinese civilization. There they conducted ceremonies followed
bv the placing of wreaths upon the tomb. A few days later these
same officials visited the nearby tombs of ancient kings of the Chou
dynasty (1122-249 b. c.) and performed similar ceremonies.
Another indication of the drift of the times in China is the in-
creased interest in the Confucian classics. Conservative groups, who
have been advocating the replacement of the classics in the school
curricula are in some parts of the country achieving their purpose.
In the provinces of Hunan and Kuangtung the simpler classics are
now being taught in the primary schools.
The loosely coordinated movement to revive Confucianism in-
dicated in these events is essentially conservative, if not reactionary.
It springs immediately out of the loss of ^lanchuria. This major
political catastrophe appears to have ushered in a new period in
China's political and national development. The failure of the West-
ern powers and the League of Nations to stem Japan's aggressions
has induced a psychological change in the outlook of Chinese lead-
ers. The belief that they must rely more upon their own resources,
spiritual as well as material to regenerate their nation morally and
physically finds repeated expression in leading editorials and in the
speeches of leaders in various walks of life. The emphasis now is
on "Reconstruction" and "Regeneration'' through a slow building
up from within. Movements and programs designed to achieve
these aims seek broad popular and local support essential to success
in the highlv integrated and traditionally localized Chinese society.
China's foreign policy since the Mukden incident has likewise
undergone a marked change. Whereas before 1931 under the Na-
tionalist Kuomintang government, a policy of "revolutionary
diplomacy" was carried through in a highly charged anti-foreign
atmosphere, since that time practically all overt mass opposition *-o
foreign imperialism has disappeared. This is not to be interpreted
to mean that the government nor the vocal elements of the populace
are resigned to the loss of Manchuria, nor that they have aban-
doned all efforts to recover sovereign rights relinquished in the series
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of "unequal" treaties and agreements signed in the course of the past
century. Only the methods have changed. The anti-foreignism
engendered through textbooks, periodicals, and the platform coupled
with the "revolutionary diplomacy" of the 1927-to-1931 period is
now understood as being a prime factor in initiating the series of
events which led to the occupation of ^Manchuria by Japanese forces.
Likewise the half-hearted attempts of certain great powers having
vital interests in China to stem Japan's advance is attributed to the
influence of certain governmental and business groups in those coun-
tries who believed that Japan in curbing the excesses of the Chinese
nationalists was fighting their battle as well, by putting ofif to a still
more distant future the time when they must give up their special
privileges in China.
Hence necessity has dictated a change of policy. Stunned by
Japan's drastic action and forced upon imminent threat of further
territorial losses, the Nanking government has forsaken "revolu-
tionary diplomacy" based on a negative anti-foreign type of nation-
alism. Open student demonstrations have been almost w"holly
suppressed or driven underground, and the boycott of Japanese goods
has been on the whole eft'ectively curbed. The easy successes of
Japanese armies on Chinese soil has poignantly impressed on the
leaders of China the weakness which still afflicts the state from a
political and military point of view. This weakness they perceive
arises from two sources, the one of a spiritual or moral character
resulting in lack of political unity and the other of a material or
economic character which limits the military strength of the nation.
Until these two basic weaknesses are eliminated the nation must
abandon hope of attaining full national sovereignty and the recovery
of lost territory. This may take a generation or fifty years they
realistically assert, but like the ancient Chinese worthy who slept on
his mat for ten years to remind himself that he must return and
recover his lost territory, they assert they will not lose sight of
their ultimate goal.
In order to build up the economic strength of the country, the
government has within the lasffew years launched upon an extensive
and elaborate program of economic reconstruction. The problem
of improved communications still remains uppermost. Some rail-
road building has been undertaken, but more energy has been ex-
pended in auto road construction, the amount of mileage of which
has increased several fold in recent years. Agricultural rehabilita-
\
CHINA REVIVES CONFUCIANISM 27
tion has been receiving more attention in the last few years than
ever before. Rural credit societies and marketing- and purchasing
cooperatives are being organized. In the industrial field the Na-
tional government plans through the recently acquired control over
the tariff to protect home industry as well as to foster it through
direct subsidies. Likewise, through national bureaus for testing
and grading, it is planned to improve and produce uniform tea,
silk, and other commodity exports to accelerate foreign-trade ex-
pansion. In these and other ways the government is striving to
achieve economic reconstruction as a prelude to the establishment of
a strong state capable of recovering its full administrative and ter-
ritorial sovereignty.
In a country which for centuries has been under the all-pervad-
ing influence of Confucian moral concepts the belief persists that
programs for material reconstruction will be of little avail if there
is not accompanying moral regeneration. Before attempting to set
forth in more detail the factors which gave rise to the present
Confucian revival and to evaluate its strength and nature, it would
be well first to trace briefly the cause of the decline of Confucianism
under the Republic. With the establishment of the Republic in 1912
the classics were eliminated from the curricula of the schools and,
except for a brief attempt at a revival of Confucianism under Presi-
dent Yuan Shih-k'ai in the years 1913-1916, the attack upon the
cult by the modernized and nationalistic intellectuals and students
has had increasing success until the current revival set in last year.
There are three outstanding reasons for this abandonment of Con-
fucianism. In the first place, its long association with the monarchy
and its emphasis upon loyalty to the emperor made its persistence
under a republican regime appear highly anarchronistic. Moreover,
the factions favoring the retention of its teachings were monarchists
at heart as revealed in the efforts to place Yuan Shi-k'ai upon the
throne. Secondly, it was the formalized embodiment of all that
was held to be conservative and, therefore, an obstacle to the modern-
ization of the state, particularly in its emphasis upon respect for
elders, and the necessity for maintaining the all-embracing author-
itarian family-system sustained by ancestor worship. From this
angle it was seen as a restraining force preventing the citizens
of the new republic from giving their fullest loyalty to the state
in patriotic service because of prior allegiance to and dependence
upon the family. It was held, therefore, to be a hindrance to the
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spread of modern nationalism which the awakened intellectuals had
discovered in the west and which they were more or less consciously
imitating and fostering. Finally, those who had drunk deeply from
the wells of western science and rationalism dubbed it another re-
ligion to be abolished, along with Buddhism and Christianity, as out-
moded superstitions suited to a less advanced stage of social ad-
vancement than at present exists. As Ch'en Tu-hsiu, one of the
outstanding leaders of young China and a founder of the first
Communist party expressed it, "That which makes the people of
Europe actually superior to all nations is their positive science.
Science and reason have made an end to ignorance and superstition."
The decline of Confucianism was held to be a necessary prelude to
the establishment of a modernized nationalistic state capable of
claiming and securing utmost loyalty from all its members.
These three points of criticism explain in part the development
of one of the more striking paradoxes of the modernization of
China: a gradually expanding and intensifying nationalism in con-
flict with a people's idealized and formalized social and intellectual
heritage. In the haste to modernize—a haste forced upon them by
the repeated aggressions of the Western powers and Japan which
threatened the very existence of the state itself as a territorial unit
—the modern Chinese have in the confusion and bewilderment of
a revolutionary period sought to uproot their old culture and com-
mence de novo. That they, one of the most historically conscious of
all peoples, suddenly appeared to be deaf to all the lessons of history
only serves to heighten the piquancy of the paradox. The intellectual
and educational leaders uncritically and naively hoped to create
within a generation the western ideal of an individualized body of
citizens living in and effectively running a modern democratic state.
Faith in the old culture thoroughly shattered, they attempted through
the literal translation of western studies and textbooks on political
theory and civics to create this modern type of citizen through an
expanding modern educational system. They felt they had found
an adequate cohesive substitute for Confucianism in the attempted
formation of a body of democratic, individualized citizens who would
be supremely loyal to the political state.
Before, however, the new experiment was allowed even a fair
amount of time to work itself out, the inevitable foreign aggressions
upon the weak and divided nation were renewed. This time foreign
interference resulted in the massacre of students and civilians in
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Shanghai, Canton, and elsewhere in ^lay and June 1925. Immediately
there appeared a violent form of anti-foreign nationalism which de-
nounced on the one hand the imperialistic powers and on the other the
excessive westernization, particularly of the educational system. The
appeal of the conservatives to call a halt to revolutionary efforts at
modernization was not to be heeded at this time. The Kuomintang
party which for years had been restricted to a minor political role
at Canton gathered strength, through Communist guidance, from
the tide of anti-foreignism sweeping the country. In the summer
of 1926 the party launched its northern campaign to wrest the
country from the grasp of the oppressive war-lords and to free
it from the control of the imperialistic powers. Its relatively well-
trained military force, ably supported by an effective propaganda
technique which broadcast its aims widely over the land, accounted
for the striking success of the northern drive. In the spring of 1927
the capital of the Nationalist Government was set up in Nanking and
with the fall of Peking a year later, control over a greater part of
the country has been achieved.
Once seated in power a rapid move toward the right occurred
within the party and the government. The communists were driven
from the party, and one military campaign after another was
launched to overthrow the successive communistic regimes set up in
various localized areas. The government turned toward the land-
lords and the rising industrial and financial bourgeoisie for financial
support. In order to win their confidence, it not only combatted the
communist movement, but also suppressed and regulated the labor
unions and the student movement. Time was needed to consolidate
its position and to extend its more effective control over the country.
Nevertheless, the waves of revolutionary emotionalism and anti-
foreignism which the party had consciously fostered and upon which
it rode into power continued to sweep through the land. The local
Kuomintang headquarters not being under the effective disciplinary
control of the Central Executive Committee continued to agitate for
the recovery of national rights. In ^Manchuria they were particularly
effective in promoting a policy designed to thwart Japanese efforts
to consolidate and expand their economic control over the area.
Hence arose the series of incidents which finally culminated in the
occupation of the area by Japanese forces and the subsequent
establishment of "Manchoutikuo."
The shock of these developments brought the inevitable reaction
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and the heeding of more conservative counsels with the rapid decHne
of the revokitionary spirit. In this atmosphere the loosely co-
ordinated efforts at the revival of Confucianism have taken place.
They were designed to restore to the people confidence in their own
cultural heritage and through that in their racial and political
destiny. While the New Life Movement has not yet identified
itself formally with the term Confucianism its emphasis and spirit
is essentially in harmony with the basic concepts which cluster around
the word. Other governmental measures already taken are a further
and more positive indication of the drift of the times toward a
Confucian revival.
It is of course at this time impossible to foretell how far or how
long the movement will continue to grow. There may be only a
brief interlude before another period of revolutionary activity sweeps
the country submerging the remaining vestiges of the old culture
and carrying the nation further along the way toward moderniza-
tion. As long as the present political set-up, characterized by Japan's
hegemony, persists in Eastern Asia, one can predict with consider-
able assurance that the movement for the revival of the old moral
culture will continue to grow in strength. The steps taken to estab-
lish the state of "Manchoutikuo'' on the Confucian principles em-
bodied in the term Wang Tao or "Kingly Way" under Japanese
guidance is a clue to this possibility. There the official revival of a
modified Confucian cult has become a well-established fact. Moral
teachings drawn from the Classics have found their way into the
class-rooms of the expanding educational system.
In Japan itself, Confucian teachings have been retained in the
schools throughout the period of modernization and industrialization.
Japanese leaders attribute the strength of the Empire in part at least
to it. The lessons to be learned from their neighbor's striking suc-
cess in meeting the West on its own terms and still retaining the
essence of their own peculiar cultural heritage, which in large
measure they had centuries earlier inherited from China, has not
been entirely overlooked by the Chinese. The first modern system
of education adopted under the Empire in 1903 was modelled upon
the one then in vogue in Japan. The study of the Confucian classics
found an important place in that system. The elimination of the
classics from the school system since the establishment of the Repub-
lic caused one writer to lament the fact that "what was cast out as
stone in China was retained as jade in Japan." Many conservatives
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in China have attributed the country's weakness from a pohtical
and mihtary point of view as well as the moral degeneration of the
people to the abandonment of the nation's cultural heritage. For the
time at least, the warnings of the conservatives are being heeded
and their advice is beginning to be carried out.
Finally, the attempt to appraise the strength and longevity of the
present revival of Confucianism necessitates the consideration of
factors operating in countries outside of the Far East. World
tendencies at present toward national economic and cultural self-
sufificiency sustained by an intense form of integrated nationalism
lend further strength to the reaction now prevailing in China. In
1840 China's door was forced open by British guns and since that
date it has remained open, partly by force and partly by the wish of
the Chinese themselves, not only to western and Japanese com-
mercial and financial exploitation, but also to admit all aspects of
western thought and practice. Xow the door is closing again.
China like many another nation is seeking to pull itself up largely
by its own bootstraps. The answer to the question as to the future
of the present tendencies toward a Confucian revival, like the
answer to many another question as to the future course of events
in China, is to be found nearly as much in the course of events in
the world at large as in China itself.

